Abstract

In this paper we will outline preliminary thoughts on Enhancement as deviation. First we will give an outlook on necessary cognitive deviations in epistemological dynamic change of habits, diagrammatic reasoning, hypostatic abstractions and theoretic/theorematic shifts (Peirce). Secondly, we will look at different modes of deviation and thus its possibilities for enhancement, beyond the enhancement – treatment dichotomy in different concepts of health. The biostatistical model by Boorse (1975, 1977) besides claiming to be a naturalistic-functional model of health seems the standard idea behind a species-typical reference class of humanity in relation to health and the model of restitutio at integrum, that seems to have just one way of dealing with deviation and that is to make it disappear by reinstituting the normality of “natural” functionality. Overcoming a natural-functional approach to health in medicine seems important to face the limitations dealing with individual qualitative indicators of wellbeing (see: Lenk 2011; WHO 1966; United Nations 1948), becoming more and more important in personal integrative medicine (besides personalized medicine) and equally for enhancements as deviations.

Third we will outline the concept of enhancement/ deviations in the framework of the “Pharmakon” (Plato/Derrida) – an important concept of technology assessment in which deviation is contextualized as remedy and/or poison among other connotations and as such a assessment concept of the positive effects and risks of a technique/technology of deviation. Anthopogenesis is herby seen as a proper technogenesis (Stiegler): How can a technology be put into perspective relative to the enhancement/deviation it introduces? How do we deviate with technology? We will look at technologies of the self and self-other relation especially in the mode of immersive interfaces and differentiate degrees of Enhancement for example in the Neuroelectronic interface and the Immersive Virtual interface from “radical enhancement” types (Agar 2009) as alteration (Grunwald 2013) for example in optogenetic control mechanisms as in the enhancement of forgetting. Is alteration ontologically still a type of deviation?

In a forth philosophical model of deviation in enhancement we underline an Ethics of Exercise (Sloterdijk 2009; 2010): Exercising in all its forms- including the way we do philosophy or even science- is based on repetition and necessary deviations from a status quo (transcending activity). Finally we conclude that necessary deviations are a method of methodological enhancement, and a necessary condition of scientific inquiry and discovery.